In these notes, I explain in further detail the model in my paper "Fiscal Policy with Financial Frictions."
Introduction
In these notes, I explain in further detail the model in my paper "Fiscal Policy with Financial
Frictions"that appears in AER, P&P May 2010.
A Model of Financial Frictions with Fiscal Policy
I describe a simple model with a representative household, …nal and intermediate good producers, producers of capital, entrepreneurs, …nancial intermediaries, and a government that conducts monetary and …scal policy. The …nancial frictions appear as a consequence of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.
Household
There is a representative household that maximizes a utility function:
t e t log (c t hc t 1 ) l
where c t is consumption, l t hours worked, m t 1 =p t (where p t is the price level) real money balances that the household carry into the period, is the discount factor, h controls habit persistence, and t is an intertemporal preference shock with law of motion: t = d t 1 + " ;t where " ;t N (0; 1):
This intertemporal shock allows me to capture changes in aggregate demand in a simple way.
Empirically, it helps the Euler intertemporal equation of consumption to …t the data.
The representative household has a non-trivial portfolio decision since it can save on:
1. Money balances to carry into the next period, m t .
2. Nominal deposits at the …nancial intermediary, a t , which pay an uncontingent nominal gross interest rate R t .
3. Nominal government bonds, d t , which pay an uncontingent nominal gross return Rd t .
4. Arrow securities over all possible events. Since, in equilibrium, the net supply of those securities must be zero, we do not include them in the budget constraint to save on notation. This complete markets assumption will be convenient below to price the future ‡ows of pro…ts of the …rms in the economy (and, for the matter, any other redundant asset, such a long-term bonds).
Given the portfolio possibilities, the household's budget constraint is given by:
(1 + where real consumption is taxed at rate c;t , the real wage w t is is taxed at a rate l;t , the net returns on deposits are taxed at rate R;t , T t is a lump-sum transfer from the result of open market operations of the monetary authority, z t are the pro…ts of the …rms in the economy (…nancial and non-…nancial) plus the intermediation costs of the …nancial …rm, and tre t is the net real transfer to new and from old entrepreneurs that we will describe momentarily and that takes the form:
Note that the returns on public debt are not taxed. If the tax were a constant or it would be determined in period t 1 for returns on period t, it would be irrelevant to have the tax or not: an arbitrage condition would raise the before-tax return on public debt and leave the after-tax return unchanged, namely, the government would pay higher interest rates and recover higher taxes without any real change in allocations. If the tax for period t were announced on period t, we would be introducing a state-dependent return on public debt that it is more convenient to abstract at the moment to keep the analysis focused (and which is rarely observed in practice anyway).
The …rst order conditions for the problem of the household are:
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint (I omit the …rst order condition with respect to money holdings since it will be irrelevant for the dynamics of the model). Note that the second and third …rst order condition imply the arbitrage condition:
This condition illustrates that, while both R t and Rd t are uncontingent, the after tax returns on deposits are not. Therefore, in equilibrium, there will be a premium on the after-tax returns of deposits over the return of public debt to compensate for that tax risk.
The Final Good Producer
There is one …nal good produced using intermediate goods according to the aggregator:
where " is the elasticity of substitution across goods.
The …nal good producer is perfectly competitive and maximize pro…ts subject to the production function (1), taking as given all intermediate goods prices p ti and the …nal good price p t . Thus, the input demand functions is:
where y t is the aggregate demand and price level:
Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers that enjoy some market power on their own good. Each intermediate good producer i has access to a technology represented by a production function
where k it 1 is the capital rented by the …rm, l it is the amount of labor input rented by the …rm, and where the productivity level z t follows:
z t = z z t 1 + z " z;t where " z;t N (0; 1):
Cost minimizations implies:
and that the marginal cost is:
Since all the intermediate good producers face the same prices, market clearing imposes that:
This result will be convenient below when we derive an expression for aggregate supply.
The …rms are subject to a Calvo pricing mechanism. In each period, a fraction 1 of …rms can change their prices while all other …rms keep the previous price. All other …rms can only index their prices by past in ‡ation. Indexation is controlled by the parameter 2 [0; 1], where = 0 is no indexation and = 1 is total indexation. The problem of …rm i is then to solve:
where the marginal value of a dollar to the household, as determined by the ratio of Lagrangian multipliers, is treated as exogenous by the …rm.
Using the fact that we deal with a symmetric equilibrium where p it = p t , (and after a fair amount of algebra), the relative reset price t = p t =p t is set such that the following conditions are satis…ed:
where f 1 t and f 2 t are two auxiliary variables. Also, given Calvo's pricing, the price index evolves as:
Capital Good Producers
Capital is created by a perfectly competitive capital good producer that buys installed capital, x t , and adds new investment, i t using the …nal good in the economy, to generate new installed capital for the next period:
The period pro…ts of the …rm are then:
where q t is the relative price of capital in the period. The discounted pro…ts for the capital good producer are then:
Note that this objective function does not depend on the level of x t and hence we can make it equal to (1 ) k t 1 to clear the market.
The …rst order condition of this problem is:
and the law of motion for aggregate capital is:
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs use their (end-of-period) real wealth, n t , and a nominal loan b t , to purchase new installed capital k t :
When mapping into the data, we can think about wealth as equity and the loan as the sum of all liabilities of the …rm. The presence of nominal debt opens the door for a "Fisher e¤ect"
where in ‡ation increases (or de ‡ation erodes) the net wealth of entrepreneurs. We will come back to this point below.
The purchased capital is shifted by a productivity shock ! t+1 that is lognormally distributed with CDF F (!) and parameters !;t and !;t such that E t ! t+1 = 1 for all t: Therefore:
The evolution of the standard deviation is such that: log !;t = (1 ) log ! + log !;t 1 + " ;t where " ;t N (0; 1)
The shock t+1 is revealed at the end of period t right before investment decisions are decided.
Then:
To keep track of the value of !;t , we will make the dependence explicit and write F (!; !;t ) :
The entrepreneur rents the capital to intermediate good producers, who pay r t+1 . Then, at the end of the period, the entrepreneur sells the undepreciated capital to the capital good producer at price q t+1 . Therefore, the average return of the entrepreneur per nominal unit invested in period t is:
The debt contract is structured as follows. For every state with associated return on capital R k t+1 , entrepreneurs have to either pay a state-contingent gross nominal interest rate R l t+1 on the loan or default. If the entrepreneur defaults, it gets nothing: the …nancial intermediary sizes its revenue, although a proportion of that revenue is lost in bankruptcy procedures. Hence, the entrepreneur will always pay if it has generated enough revenue to do so. This will be the case if productivity is at least as high as a level ! t+1 at which the entrepreneurs just can pay back its debt:
This equation tells us that ! t+1 moves in the same direction than R l t+1 all other variables being equal. The equation is also useful because, below, instead of characterizing the debt contract in terms of R l t+1 , we will do it in terms of ! t+1 , which is much easier. If ! t+1 < ! t+1 , the entrepreneur defaults, the …nancial intermediary monitors the entrepreneur and gets (1 ) of the revenue of the entrepreneur. This is the mechanism proposed by Bernanke, borrowers and the need to have a costly-state veri…cation.
The debt contract determines R l t+1 to be the return such that …nancial intermediaries satisfy its zero pro…t condition in all states of the world:
Revenue if loan pays
Cost of funds where R t is the (non-contingent) return of households that have saved in the …nancial intermediary and s t is a spread caused by the costs of intermediation (for example, the labor costs of writing the loan contract or the cost of setting up o¢ ces for the …nancial intermediary to receive funds from households). I assume that these costs evolve stochastically over time in such a way that the spread is:
where: e s t = s e s t 1 + s " s;t where " s;t N (0; 1):
For simplicity, we will assume that the intermediation cost is rebated back to the households in a lump-sum fashion (we can imagine, for instance, that intermediation costs are wages paid back to the household on an inelastically supplied amount of intermediation know-how).
Finally, note that he zero pro…t condition loads all the aggregate risk of delivering the right level of return to the …nancial intermediary through changes in ! t+1 (and the associated movements in R l t+1 ). To explore the debt contract further, de…ne:
Share of entrepreneurial earnings accrued to the …nancial intermediary
Note that, by the properties of the lognormal distribution:
where is the CDF of a normal distribution. Thus, we can rewrite the zero pro…t condition of the …nancial intermediary as:
which gives a schedule relating R k t+1 and ! t+1 , a key component of the model. For example, when R k t+1 is low, ! t+1 is high, which increases the payo¤s to the …nancial intermediary to compensate the lower return on capital although it also raises default rates. 1 Now, de…ne the ratio of loan over wealth:
and we get and expression for the zero pro…t condition of the form:
that tells us that all the entrepreneurs , regardless of their level of wealth, will have the same leverage, % t , a most convenient feature for aggregation.
The problem of the entrepreneur is then to pick % t and a schedule for ! t+1 to maximize its expected net worth given the zero-pro…t condition of the …nancial intermediary:
with …rst order conditions:
Now, note that we can write the Lagrangian (and making the dependence on ! t+1 and !;t+1 explicit) as:
Since:
we get:
Then, going back to the optimality condition:
and using the zero pro…t condition for the …nancial intermediary:
Often, this expression is also written as:
R t ; ! t+1 ; !;t+1 n t which relates purchases of capital to level of wealth and the …nance premium, R k t+1 =R t . Finally, at the end of each period, a fraction e t of entrepreneurs survives to next period while the rest die and their capital is taxed at a 100 percent rate by the government. The dead entrepreneurs are substituted by a new cohort of entrepreneurs that enter with initial real net wealth w e (a transfer that, for simplicity in our derivations, the surviving entrepreneurs also get even if they went bankrupt in the period). Therefore, the average net wealth n t (here we are equating average wealth with the wealth of the entrepreneur since all the entrepreneurs get the same % t ) evolves as:
The share e t is equal to: This transformation ensures that e t is bounded in the unit interval while e controls the mean of deaths.
We also summarize, for future convenience, the properties of the functions that depend on ! t+1 :
Financial Intermediary
There is a representative, competitive …nancial …rm that intermediates between households and entrepreneurs. We can think about that …rm as including banks but also other …nancial institutions as venture capital …rms or investment funds commonly engaged in the matching of savers and investors. The …nancial intermediary loans to entrepreneurs a nominal amount b t at rate R l t+1 ; but recovers only an (uncontingent) rate R t because of default and intermediation costs. Therefore, the …nancial intermediary pays interest R t to the households. Also, we have, by market clearing, that loans must be equal to deposits (since all our debts are short-term we can abstract from reserve requirements for the …nancial intermediary):
The Government
The government determines monetary and …scal policy. To keep the investigation focused, in a …rst pass, I abstract from the interactions between monetary and …scal policy (for instance, I will assume that the results of open market operations are distributed in a lump-sum fashion to households and not transferred to the general revenue of the government). The current balance sheet of the Federal Reserve Bank and the dangers it entails to the U.S. Treasury suggests, though, that such an abstraction is only a provisional simpli…cation that should be removed in the close future.
Monetary Policy
The government sets the nominal interest rates according to the Taylor rule:
through open market operations that are …nanced through lump-sum transfers T t . The variable represents the target level of in ‡ation (equal to in ‡ation in the steady state); y is the steady state level of output, and R = the steady state nominal gross return of capital. The term " mt is a random shock to monetary policy distributed according to N (0; 1).
Fiscal Policy
The government intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
where:
tax t = c;t c t + l;t w t l t + R;t (R t 1 1) a t 1 p t are tax revenues. Note that we can rewrite the budget constraint as:
that makes explicit the reduction in real public debt caused by in ‡ation.
Government expenditure follows an autoregressive process:
where b g t are the log deviations with respect to the mean of the process:
and d g determines the sensitivity of expenditures to the ratio of public debt brought into the period over nominal output. A negative value of d g ensures that the model have a determined equilibrium.
Taxes follow: We sign with a minus the innovations to consumption taxes to think about them as an expansionary …scal policy shock, as it is the case with the other two taxes.
Aggregation
Using the equality of capital-labor ratio across …rms, some algebra steps give us an expression for aggregate demand:
and another for aggregate supply:
di is the ine¢ ciency created by price dispersion. By the properties of the index under Calvo's pricing, this ine¢ ciency evolves as:
Equilibrium
A de…nition of equilibrium in this economy is standard and the following equations can be solved for the 32 variables: c t , t , l t , r t , w t , f
s t , e e t , and !;t (plus the accounting de…nitions of b c;t , b l;t , b R;t , e s t , and e e t , the money holding condition and the value of R l t , whose dynamics are irrelevant for the rest of the variables).
The …rst order conditions of the household:
The …rst order conditions of the intermediate …rms:
Price index evolves:
Capital good producers:
Entrepreneur problem:
The government follows is Taylor rule:
and its budget constraint:
with expenditure and taxes:
tax t = c;t c t + l;t w t l t + R;t (R t 1 1) a t 1 p t and taxes:
Stochastic processes: 
Steady State
We de…ne b = b=p as the steady state level of real private debt. Before …nding the steady state, note that is a parameter and that we can set up all the stochastic processes and taxes to their mean. Also, we will pick:
which implies that d = d=p = 0. Then, the steady state equilibrium conditions for the household are:
for the …rm, the law of motion for prices, and capital producers:
Entrepreneur problem (where we already use q = 1):
the market clearing conditions:
and the government budget balance:
We start working on these equations. First, from the …rms's conditions, we have that:
Second, the relationship between in ‡ation and optimal relative prices is:
and the value of distortions:
To solve for the rest of the steady state, I calibrate 
to solve for R k and !. 2 A simpler system is:
and then:
With this, we can get:
With r,
and with r and l = 1=3 Now:
and the four auxiliary conditions:
Now, we have two equations left:
and we use them to back-up the values of w e and that justify our calibration
Finally, we calibrate s and e . Note that e s = s 1 and e = 1 1 + e e using the fact that e is observable as follows:
Loglinearized Equilibrium Conditions
The loglinearized equilibrium conditions are:
1. Marginal utility of consumption:
Intertemporal condition, deposits:
Intertemporal condition, public debt:
Marginal utility of labor:
6. Recursive equation for prices 1:
7. Recursive equation for prices 2:
8. FOC of …rms with respect to capital and labor:
10. Evolution of prices:
11. Adjustment cost:
Law of motion for private capital:
13. Return on capital:
14. Entrepreneur 1:
16. Entrepreneur 3:
17. Wealth evolution:
18. Taylor rule:
19. Government budget constraint:
21. Resource constraint:
23. Evolution of price dispersion ine¢ ciency:
24. Government expenditure:
. Tax on consumption:
26. Tax on labor income:
27. Tax on deposit returns:
28. Intertemporal shock:
29. Productivity process: 
Appendix I: Useful Facts about the Lognormal Distribution
If a random variables ! t+1 is lognormally distributed with CDF F (!) and parameters ! and ! ; we have:
Also, the partial expectation:
Appendix II: Useful Facts about Loglinearization
Imagine we want to loglinearize:
and:
A particular case of interest is when we loglinearize: 
Appendix III: Loglinearization
The loglinearization of all the equilibrium conditions in the model is rather straightforward except four of them, which require somewhat further work.
Equation 1: Entrepreneur FOC
We start with:
which loglinearizes to:
implies that:
a coe¢ cient we will compute numerically.
Equation 2: Zero Pro…ts for the Financial Intermediary
The second equation is:
where b will be computed numerically.
Also, note that since this equation holds state by state, it is better to write it as: Then:
e that loglinearizes to:
where
where s = 1 + e s .
Equation 4: Aggregate Demand
Finally, we have the aggregate demand:
y t = c t + i t + g t + G (! t ; !;t+1 ) (r t + q t (1 )) k t 1 
Loglinearization of the Euler condition for public debt: 
